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We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within
the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public
firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO.
We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted
Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting
profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher
likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO’s
receiving a “lucky” option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the
CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling
for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results
indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that
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Public firms are likely to vary in terms of how central the CEO is within the top 
executive team. We use the term ‘CEO centrality’ to refer to relative importance – in terms of 
ability, contribution, or power – that the CEO has within the team of top executives. This paper 
is an empirical study of CEO centrality and how it relates to firm value and behavior. We find 
that the level of CEO centrality has a rich set of relations with firm outcomes, including 
correlation with lower firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q, lower accounting profitability, 
lower quality of acquisition decisions, lower CEO turnover, more luck-based pay, and lower 
firm-specific variability of stock returns.   
Our proxy for CEO centrality is the CEO's pay slice (CPS), which we define as the 
percentage of aggregate top-five total compensation captured by the CEO. Because higher CPS 
will tend to reflect a greater relative importance of the CEO within the executive team, CPS can 
serve as a proxy for the CEO’s centrality within the top team. Moreover, as CPS is calculated 
using compensation information from executives that are all at the same firm, this controls for 
any firm-specific characteristics that affect the average level of compensation in the firm’s top 
executive team.  
Firms might differ in their CPS levels for two reasons. First, the firms might differ in 
their optimal (or “appropriate”) CPS level. This optimal CPS level in a given firm reflects the 
extent to which the CEO is a "star CEO" -- a CEO having superior talents or qualifications that 
enhance the CEO's relative contribution to the firm as well as the value of outside opportunities. 
The optimal CPS level also depends on incentive considerations. The higher the CPS level, the 
stronger the "tournament incentives" for the other executives in the top management team who 
might be promoted to the CEO post (Lazear and Rosen (1981)). Furthermore, the extent to which 
it is optimal for the firm to have a management model based on a “dominant player” might well 
depend on the firm’s circumstances.  
Second, firms might differ in how their CPS levels depart (if at all) from the optimal level 
for the firm. To the extent that the CEO has power and influence over the board and company 
decision-making, the CEO might use this power and influence to raise CPS above its optimal 
level. In such a case, the “excess CPS” – that is, the excess of the actual CPS over the optimal 
   1CPS – will reflect rents captured by the CEO. Excess CPS can be viewed as a product of 
agency/governance problems. 
This separation of CPS into two components, optimal (or appropriate) CPS and excess 
CPS, is relevant for interpreting any identified association of CPS with firm characteristics or 
behavior. A correlation of a given variable with firm differences in observed CPS levels may be 
due to (i) a correlation of the variable with the optimal level of CPS for a given firm, or (ii) a 
correlation of the variable with excess CPS (or, of course, a correlation with both).  
 Our investigation of the relation between CPS levels and firm outcomes and behavior 
has two parts. The first part examines the relationship between CPS and firm value as measured 
by Tobin's Q. As will be explained, theory allows for alternative, competing predictions as to 
whether CPS and Q will be systematically correlated and, if so, in what direction. We find a 
strong empirical relation between CPS and Q. Controlling for the various factors that prior work 
has shown to be correlated with Q, there is a significant – and economically meaningful – 
negative correlation between CPS and Q.  
These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firm value and the selection of 
CPS levels are uncorrelated or with the hypothesis that high-value firms find it optimal to choose 
high CPS levels. Rather, there are two, not mutually exclusive, explanations. First, an “optimal 
selection” explanation: the optimal level of CPS might be higher for low-value firms, and the 
identified pattern might be due to the tendency of such firms to choose high CPS levels. Second, 
a “governance” explanation: the identified pattern might be due to the correlation between low 
value and excess CPS; having a high excess CPS might reflect agency and governance problems 
that in turn bring about a reduction in firm value.  
Exploring whether the negative correlation between CPS and value is fully driven by 
optimal selection, we find that the negative relation is robust to controlling for lagged Q. We also 
find that increases in CPS are related to decreases in Q, and lower Tobin’s Q does not lead to 
increases in CPS. These results do not enable rejecting the governance/causality explanation in 
favor of an optimal selection explanation.  
Furthermore, we investigate how Q depends on the interaction between CPS and 
measures of shareholder rights (Gompers et al (2003); Bebchuk et al (2004). Consistent with the 
governance explanation, we find that the negative association between Q and CPS is 
concentrated among firms whose boards are entrenched. Because entrenchment itself is 
   2negatively correlated with Q, Q is especially low for firms that have a high entrenchment level 
and a high CPS. 
In the second part of our analysis, we examine how CEO centrality is associated with 
several types of corporate outcomes and decisions, including ones that might reflect governance 
problems. First, CPS is negatively correlated with accounting profitability. Firms with high CPS 
tend to have low industry-adjusted return on assets.  
Second, high-CPS firms tend to make worse acquisition decisions as judged by the 
market’s reaction to acquisition announcements. If the acquiring firm has a high CPS level, the 
stock return accompanying the acquisition announcement is lower and more likely to be 
negative.  
Third, firms with higher CPS are more likely to provide their CEO with opportunistically 
timed option grant. High CPS is associated with increased likelihood of the CEO’s receiving a 
“lucky” option grant with an exercise price equal to the lowest price of the grant month.  
among others, find a significant correlation between governance weaknesses and the 
occurrence of opportunistically timed option grants to CEOs. Consistent with their findings, we 
find that a higher CPS is positively associated with the likelihood of opportunistically timed 
grants. 
Fourth, high-CPS firms are more likely to reward their CEOs for luck in the sense of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) – that is, to increase CEO compensation following positive 
“industry shocks” that are not attributable to the CEO’s own performance. Such luck-based 
performance is viewed in the literature as a possible sign of governance problems.  
Fifth, CPS is associated with CEO turnover. The probability of CEO turnover is lower if 
CEO centrality is higher controlling for the CEO’s length of service and performance.  
Sixth, CPS is negatively correlated with the firm-specific variability of stock returns over 
time, a result that might be due to the tendency and power of dominant CEOs to play it safe and 
avoid firm-specific volatility (which would impose risk-bearing costs on them but could be less 
costly to diversified investors). 
We should stress that an association between actual CPS levels and excess CPS does not 
imply that all high-CPS firms have excessive CPS. In some high-CPS firms, the observed high 
level of CPS might be optimal given the firm’s circumstances. Thus, even if the negative 
correlation between value and CPS is due to the association between high CPS levels and excess 
   3CPS, this does not imply that the value of any given high-CPS firm would be increased by 
reducing its CPS level. 
1Overall, our analysis unearths a rich set of systematic relations between 
CPS levels and firm value and outcomes. The body of evidence we put forward is consistent with 
the possibility that these associations are at least partly driven by the correlation between the 
“excessive CPS” component of CPS, which in turn reflects governance problems. At minimum, 
our results indicate that CPS, and the relationship between it and the value and behavior of firms, 
are an important issue for study by financial economists. Our analysis calls for further study of 
the identified associations, including the development of a formal theoretical framework for 
studying CEO centrality. 
Our work is related to several bodies of literature. To begin, our work relates to the 
literature examining how firm value as measured by Tobin's Q is associated with governance 
arrangements. For example, studies show that Tobin's Q is negatively correlated with the 
presence of staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)), the strength of shareholder rights 
more generally (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004), and 
Cremers and Nair (2005)), and the presence of a large board (Yermack (1996)). We contribute to 
this literature by identifying yet another aspect of the firm's governance arrangements – the CPS 
level – that is associated with Tobin's Q.  
  In addition, this paper relates to the work on stock market reaction to acquisition 
announcements. Financial economists have paid close attention to buyers’ willingness to make 
acquisitions which, as measured by the stock market returns accompanying the acquisition 
announcement, the market views as value-decreasing (see, e.g., Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1991); Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990); Qui (2004); and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2005)). Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show that these returns are related to governance 
characteristics and, in particular, entrenchment provisions. We extend their work by showing that 
                                                  
1  Also, because our analysis is cross-sectional, it does not imply that increases in average CPS levels over 
time are necessarily negative. Some recent work argues that general management skills possessed by 
CEOs has become more important over time relative to the skills possessed by other top executives 
(Frydman (2005), Murphy and Zabojnik (2004)). This view suggests that the average optimal CPS level 
has increased over time. However, even if optimal CPS levels have been trending upwards, our cross-
sectional results suggest that there is a correlation at each point in time between (excess) CPS and the 
governance problems. 
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provisions. 
  Similarly, our work is related to the literature on opportunistic timing of option grants 
and its relation to firm governance and structure (see, e.g., Yermack (1997), Lie (2005), Bebchuk 
et al (2006)). We extend this work by showing that, controlling for other governance provisions,  
opportunistic timing of option grants is associated with high CPS.   
Our work is also related to the work on rewarding CEOs for luck by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2000, 2001). These authors focus on increases in CEO compensation following 
positive industry-wide shocks that cannot be attributable to the CEO’s performance and thus 
constitute “luck,” and they showed that such rewards for luck are more likely to occur in the 
absence of a large outside blockholder. We complement this work by identifying CPS as another 
factor that is associated with such rewards for industry-wide positive shocks.  
Similarly, our work is further related to the substantial literature on CEO turnover (see, 
e.g., Jenter and Kanaan (2006), Kaplan and Minton (2006)). We extend this literature by 
showing that high CPS is associated with a lower CEO turnover controlling for performance.  
  Two earlier studies have used different measures of CEO dominance within the top 
executive team. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), in a study of alternative mechanisms for 
transfer of corporate control, define CEOs as powerful when no other person holds the title of 
President or Chairman and no other person co-signs the letter to shareholders in the annual 
report. More recently, in investigating how the presence of a powerful CEO is correlated with the 
variability of stock returns, Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) assume CEOs to be more 
powerful when they serve as chair of the board, when they are the only insider on the board, and 
when they have the status of a founder. We put forward in this paper CPS as a measure of CEO 
dominance that might capture differences not captured by formal status variables. As we shall 
see, CPS is positively correlated with such variables, but they explain only a small part of the 
variability in CPS.  
  Finally, we should note the growing literature on the type and style of CEOs for firm 
outcomes (see e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003)). Our work 
seeks to highlight the importance of the relative importance of the CEO vis-à-vis other members 
of the top team for firm outcomes. 
   5Our analysis is organized as follows. Section II describes our data and presents summary 
statistics. Section III analyzes the relationship between CEO centrality and Tobin's Q as well as 
accounting profitability. Section IV examines the relation between centrality and abnormal 
acquirer returns, firm-specific variability of returns, CEO turnover, CEO pay for luck, and 
abnormal returns around announcements of CPS changes. Finally, Section VI concludes.  
 
II. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
A. The CEO Centrality Index 
 
Because CEO centrality is not directly observable to researchers, the proxy for CEO 
centrality used in this paper is the CEO’s pay slice (CPS). CPS is defined as the percentage of 
the total compensation to the top five executives that goes to the CEO. The importance of the 
CEO relative to the other members of the top executive team -- in terms of contribution, ability, 
or power – is expected to be reflected in CPS.  
Because CPS is likely the product of many observable and non-observable dimensions of 
the firm’s top executives and management model, CPS may enable us to capture dimensions of 
the CEO’s role in the top team beyond the ones captured by formal and easily observed variables 
such as whether the CEO also chairs the board.  CPS is positively correlated with (i) a dummy 
equal to one if the CEO also chairs the board, and (ii) a dummy equal to one if the CEO is the 
only executive of the firm who is a member of the board.
2 However, a regression of CPS on 
these two variables results in an adjusted r-squared of only 0.009, indicating that CPS is likely to 
capture other information not contained in those two variables. In addition, because CPS is 
calculated using the compensation figures for the top executives at the same firm, it directly 
controls for any firm-specific characteristics that affect the average level of executive 
compensation at the firm level.  
                                                  
2   The correlation of CPS with the first variable is 0.055 (significant at the 1% level) and the correlation 
of CPS with the second variable is 0.073 (significant at the 1% level). The second variable is related not 
only to the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team but also to the relative 
importance of the executive team on the board (Raheja (2005)).  
   6We compute the CEO's pay slice (CPS) using data from Compustat’s ExecuComp 
database from 1993 – 2004.
3 Our main measure is based on the total compensation to each 
executive, including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock granted 
that year, the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted that year, long-term incentive 
payouts, and all other total compensation (as reported in ExecuComp item # TDC1).  
 
B. Summary Statistics 
    
Univariate statistics for the average CPS and its dispersion across the 12 Fama-French 
industries are shown in Table 1, where averages are computed using a panel dataset of 12,011 
observations. Using the universe of firms in the ExecuComp database, we find that CPS is, on 
average, 34.4% in our time period of 1993 – 2004.  
For each of the 12 industries, we compute the industry mean and median CPS. We find 
that there is some variation across industries in average CPS. The lowest CPS industry is 
Telecom with 31.1%, and the highest CPS industry is Chemical with 37.4%.  
To assess the significance of the differences in industry average CPS, we run Tobit 
regressions with CPS as the dependent variable and industry dummies as the independent 
variables. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 1. Using the Energy industry 
as the holdout industry, we find that five of the twelve industries display significantly different 
levels of CPS. In addition to the observed variation in industry average CPS, within-industry 
variations in CPS are even more substantial. For example, the Energy industry has a within-
industry standard deviation of CPS of 10.4% on an average of 35.1%. This suggests that CPS is 
in part determined by industry characteristics, but to a large extent, CPS is CEO- and firm-
specific. 
  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of several pertinent firm characteristics that will be 
used in our analysis. We use various Compustat, CRSP, IRRC, and ExecuComp variables: 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. The industry adjustment is made at the 
four-digit SIC level. Industry-adjusted ROA is the return on assets computed as net income 
                                                  
3 Whenever ExecuComp reports more than five executives in a given year, we select the top five 
executives (in terms of total compensation) only to compute CPS for that year.  
   7divided by book value of assets adjusted by the median ROA of the firms in Compustat in a 
given four-digit SIC industry and year. It is expressed in percentage terms. The entrenchment 
index (Eindex) consists (following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004)) of 6 shareholder rights 
provisions in a firm’s charter. Eindex ranges between 0 and 6, where higher values indicate 
weaker shareholder rights or more entrenched management.
4  Book value (in logs) is the book 
value of assets. Insider ownership is the fraction of shares held by insiders as reported by 
ExecuComp. Capex/Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to assets. R&D is the ratio of research and development to sales. If R&D is 
missing, it is set to zero and the dummy variable R&D missing is set to one. Company age is 
computed as the current year minus the year in which the company was first listed on CRSP.  
Table 2 reports averages and standard deviations for all these variables. In addition, we 
show the average separately for firms with high versus low CPS, proxying for high CPS by 
industry-adjusting CPS. Firms with a positive industry-adjusted CPS display a lower industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q and lower industry-adjusted ROA. These firms also have lower insider 
ownership, a higher Eindex, a larger book value, higher leverage, and higher age.  
By themselves, these univariate results are inconclusive. High entrenchment and high age 
are both correlated with low industry-adjusted Q. Thus, it is possible that the negative correlation 
between CPS and Tobin’s Q is due to the tendency of high-CPS firms to have high Eindex and 
high age. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the negative correlation between CPS 
and firm value holds in a multivariate regression, which we shall do in the next section.  
  
III. CEO CENTRALITY AND FIRM VALUE 
 
A. How Should CPS and Firm Value Be Expected to Correlate? 
 
Before proceeding, we first discuss whether and how CPS should be expected to correlate 
with firm value on theoretical grounds. In thinking about this question, it is useful to distinguish 
                                                  
4 The Eindex is based on data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which are 
updated in the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. For the years where IRRC data is not 
updated, we use the last value available. For further details, see Bebchuk et al. (2004). As a robustness 
test, we have also used the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (Gindex), consisting of 24 charter 
provisions, and the results are qualitatively similar. The results using Gindex are available upon request.  
   8between two possible components of a firm’s CPS level. One component is the “optimal” level 
of CPS in this firm given the pool of executives available to the team and the business 
environment the firm is facing. The other component is the “excess CPS,” which is the amount 
(if any) by which actual CPS exceeds the optimal CPS.   
(i) Optimal CPS Levels: The optimal CPS level might vary across firms. Among other 
things, this optimal level depends on (i) the extent to which it is desirable for the firm to have a 
dominant player model based on one especially important player rather than a management 
model based on a team of top executives, (ii) the extent to which it is desirable to provide 
“tournament incentives” to top executives other than the CEO, (iii) the extent to which it is 
desirable to concentrate dollars spent on incentive generation on the CEO, and (iv) the pool of 
candidates available to the firm from which the members of the top executive team were hired.  
Each of these considerations clearly depends on factors that might vary from firm to firm (or 
even from time to time for the same firm).  
For example, compared with a team player model, a dominant player management model 
could have both advantages and disadvantages, the magnitude of which could well vary from 
case to case. On the one hand, a dominant player model could provide clarity, steadiness, and 
reduction in the cost of decision-making. On the other hand, there is a large body of literature, 
starting with Shaw (1932),
5 extolling the benefits of group rather than individual decision-
making, and there is some experimental data showing that groups often outperform individuals in 
decision-making (see Bainbridge (2002) for a survey). Furthermore, a dominant player model 
and the high CPS coming with it can lead to resentment on the part of the other members of the 
top team (Brill (1993) and Cook (1990)).  
Similarly, a tournament environment can provide both positive and negative incentives to 
top executives other than the CEO (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)). On one hand, a tournament 
may provide executives other than the CEO with incentives to excel to increase their chances of 
succeeding the CEO. On the other hand, a tournament may also produce deadweight costs by, for 
example, causing executives vying for the CEO position to cooperate less with, or even seek to 
undermine, their rivals.  
(ii) Selection of Optimal CPS Levels: Consider the case in which there are no agency 
problems that might lead firms to set CEO centrality at any level other than the optimal one. In 
                                                  
5  See also Miner (1984), Blinder and Morgan (2000), and Hill (1982). 
   9this case, by definition, no firm would be able to increase its value by changing its CPS level; 
any increase or decrease of CPS from the optimal level could only hurt value.  
In the considered case, however, CPS levels could well differ among firms, as they all 
make the selection optimal for their circumstances, and accordingly an association between CPS 
levels and firm values could arise. To the extent that such an association would arise, it would 
reflect a selection mechanism. 
As to the direction of this selection effect, theory does not provide us with an 
unambiguous prediction. First, it could be argued that low-value firms in need of a turnaround 
might have a greater need for a dominant player and powerful tournament incentives for their 
other top players. Following this hypothesis, optimal CPS and value are expected to be 
negatively correlated. Secondly, the need for a dominant player and powerful tournament 
incentives may in fact be greater with high-value firms that have high growth opportunities that 
need to be decisively and vigorously pursued. Following this hypothesis, optimal CPS and firm 
value would be positively correlated. Third, the factors calling for more or less CEO centrality 
are ones that could be distributed independently of firm value. According to this hypothesis 
optimal CPS would be uncorrelated with firm value. Thus, to the extent that selection effects 
play a significant role, an empirical investigation would be necessary to choose among these 
competing hypotheses.  
(iii) Deviations from Optimal CPS Levels: Thus far the discussion has assumed that all 
CPS levels are optimally set. However, because choices are partly made by agents whose 
behavior is influenced by their private interests and thus involves agency costs, choices might 
not be made in an optimal fashion. For example, a CEO might use her power and influence to 
push for a greater use of a dominant player model and higher CPS than optimal for the firm. In 
such a case, CPS might be higher than optimal, with the excess reflecting rents captured by the 
CEO. 
Let “excess CPS” denote the excess of the actual CPS level over the optimal level. As 
long as the excess level does not have a perfectly negative correlation with the optimal level, 
actual CPS level can be expected to be positively correlated with excess CPS. In this case, 
correlation between excess CPS levels and a given variable can translate into a correlation 
between this variable and observed CPS levels.       
   10A high level of excess CPS – that is, a substantial departure from the optimal CPS level – 
can be viewed as a manifestation of significant governance problems. It might reflect a state of 
affairs in which the CEO is making a considerable use of the CEO’s power, and plays an 
excessively central role in the top executive team, in pursuit of private rents. Accordingly, high 
levels of excess pay, and the governance problems they reflect, would be correlated with low 
firm value. Thus, to the extent that observed CPS levels do indeed contain a potentially 
significant component of excess CPS, such presence can be expected to produce a negative 
correlation between CPS and firm value.  
 
B. The Association between CPS and Tobin's Q 
 
In this section, we turn to studying empirically the association between CPS and firm 
value. Our principal measure of firm value is Tobin’s Q. This follows a substantial literature on 
the association between firm value and various corporate arrangements, which extensively used 
Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988); Lang and Stulz (1994); Yermack (1996); and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003)). Our definition of Tobin’s Q is that used by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and 
subsequently also by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).6 Our dependent variable is the 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, using industry-adjustments at the four-digit SIC code level.
7
Our regressions include the standard controls used in the above literature. In particular, 
we control for firm size (in logs of the book value of assets), insider ownership and insider 
ownership squared (see McConnell and Servaes (1990)), profitability (ROA), the ratio of capital 
expenditures to assets (Capex/Assets), leverage, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales (R&D), a 
dummy for missing R&D data, the age of the firm (in logs) (see Shin and Stulz (2000)), and year 
fixed effects. We also include the entrenchment index, Eindex, which has been shown to be 
                                                  
6   According to this specification, Q is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets (Compustat item 6), where the market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets (item 
6) plus the market value of common stock (item 24 * item 25) less the sum of book value of common 
stock (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74). 
7   An alternative specification of our regressions, with log Q as the dependent variable and SIC codes as 
industry fixed effects, yields similar results throughout. Also, using the Fama-French classification of 48 
industry groups, rather than four-digit SIC codes, yields similar results throughout. 
   11negatively correlated with firm value controlling for standard controls (Eindex) (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2004)).  
The results, which are displayed in Table 3, indicate that higher CPS has a strong 
association with lower firm value. The first four regressions employ pooled panel regressions 
with year fixed effects. Column 1 uses a contemporaneous association between industry-adjusted 
Q and CPS, and column 2 uses lagged CPS and lagged ownership variables.
8 The economic 
significance is strongest in column 2: a one standard deviation shock in the value of CPS (equal 
to 11.73%) is associated with a reduction in next year’s Tobin’s Q of 5.5% (= 11.73% x -0.475). 
Column 3 and 4 indicate that these results continue to hold using industry-adjusted CPS.  
As another robustness check, columns 5 and 6 present the Fama-MacBeth type (average) 
coefficients of 12 annual cross-sectional regressions. The average coefficients of CPS and lagged 
CPS are negative and significant, and their average levels are quite similar to those of the 
corresponding coefficients in regressions 1 and 2, respectively.  
In column 7 of Table 3, we test whether the documented relation in regression 1 between 
CPS and Tobin’s Q is due to the fact that CPS contains information that is already available in 
the form of proxies such as whether the CEO is also the Chair and whether the CEO is the only 
member of the board of directors among the top five executives. Such variables have been used 
by Adams et al. (2006) as proxies for CEO-versus-group decision making and are expected to be 
related to the concept of CEO centrality. We find that CPS remains strongly negatively 
associated with Tobin’s Q even after controlling for these two additional variables, and that none 
of these two additional variables is significantly related to Tobin’s Q. This result indicates that 
CPS is capturing more than these two already-available proxies for the relative importance of the 
CEO in the top executive team.  
 
C. Optimal Selection and Agency Explanations  
 
The above results concerning the negative correlation between CPS and Tobin’s Q are 
inconsistent with some of the hypotheses discussed in section III.A. In particular, the results rule 
out the hypothesis that firms set their CPS levels optimally and these levels are uncorrelated with 
                                                  
8  When using lagged CPS (t-1), we require that the CEO remains in place the following year (t). The 
results are qualitatively similar without this constraint (not shown separately). 
   12firm value. The results similarly rule out the hypothesis that firms set CPS levels optimally and 
these levels are positively correlated with firm value.  
The identified pattern is consistent with and can be explained by the following two (not 
mutually exclusive) hypotheses: 
• Optimal Selection: firms’ optimal CPS levels are negatively correlated with firm value. 
• Governance/agency: some firms do not set CPS optimally, and excess CPS levels are 
negatively correlated with firm value.  
In the subsequent three tables, we conduct several tests as to whether it is possible to 
establish that the identified negative correlation between CPS and industry-adjusted Q is all due 
to a tendency of low-Q firms to choose high CPS. Table 4 displays the results of regressions 
similar to those shown in Table 3 with the addition of one- and two-year lagged industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q. This controls for the level of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q that the firm had 
prior to the setting of the CPS level serving as a dependent variable. The results indicate that 
CPS or lagged CPS (industry-adjusted or not) remains negatively associated with industry-
adjusted Q (though with weakened statistical significance) even when controlling for lagged Q. 
This finding does not support the hypothesis that the association between CPS and low Q is fully 
driven by a tendency of low-Q firms to adopt high CPS levels.   
Next, Table 5 shows regressions of percentage changes in Tobin’s Q on changes in CPS. 
We find that changes in firm value are negatively correlated with changes in CPS. This result is 
robust to including control variables or changes in control variables. (In the latter case, the 
statistical significance of the CPS coefficient is weaker, with a p-value of 0.055, but the size of 
the coefficient is almost identical to the other two specifications.)  
Finally, in Table 6, we investigate all 1,326 CEO changes in the universe of firms in our 
sample, and compare CPS between the new and the old CEO depending on the Tobin’s Q of the 
firms. If low value firms are more optimally run with a high CPS, then we would expect to find 
that the new CEO has a significantly higher CPS than new CEOs of high value firms. We find no 
significant differences in CPS, nor industry-adjusted CPS between newly hired CEOs in lower-
valued (with an industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q that is negative or with a Tobin’s Q below 1) versus 
higher valued firms. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between low and high value 
firms in terms of the increase in CPS that the new CEO receives relative to the predecessor. The 
p-value of the difference in the change of CPS from the old CEO to the new CEO across firms 
   13with Tobin’s Q above versus below 1 has a p-value of 11%, and using negative versus positive 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q the p-value is 82%. Thus, this analysis does not provide significant 
evidence that the identified negative correlation between CPS and Q can be fully explained by a 
tendency of low-value firms to set high levels of CPS. 
 
D. Interaction with Shareholder Rights 
 
To further explore the possibility that the negative correlation between CPS and firm 
value is amenable to a governance/agency explanation, we examine whether the association is 
more or less pronounced in firms with high entrenchment levels. In such firms, the CEO and the 
board are relatively insulated from market discipline and the threat of removal, and the potential 
for agency problems in general, and departures from optimal levels of CEO centrality in 
particular, is higher.  
Table 7 displays the results of adding the interaction of CPS with the Eindex as an 
additional independent variable to the specifications of Table 3. Columns 1 (using 
contemporaneous CPS) and 2 (using lagged CPS) show that the lower value for firms with 
higher CPS is driven by firms with high entrenchment as measured by the Eindex. We include 
both CPS and CPS interacted with the Eindex, and only the interaction has a significant (and 
negative) coefficient. This suggests a complementary relationship, as it is only firms with both 
entrenchment and high CPS that have lower firm values. 
The results using lagged CPS are especially strong, indicating that there is a strong 
relation between today’s CPS and future firm value. For firms with maximum entrenchment 
(Eindex value of 6), a one standard deviation positive shock to CPS is associated with a 
reduction in next year’s industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of 22% (= 11.73% x 6 x -0.311, see column 
2). Interestingly, using lagged CPS and the interaction of lagged CPS with the Eindex drives out 
the importance of the Eindex in isolation.  
Column 3-6 use alternative specifications along the lines developed earlier in Table 3. 
Column 3 and 4 use industry-adjusted CPS rather than CPS. Columns 5 and 6 use Fama-
MacBeth type regressions with industry-adjusted CPS. Throughout, the interaction term of CPS 
and Eindex is negative and significant.  
   14Thus, the data suggest that the negative correlation between CPS and firm value is more 
pronounced in firms with high entrenchment levels. In such firms, the potential for departures 
from optimal CPS levels might be more significant, and as a result the distribution of actual CPS 
levels could be more influenced by the distribution of excess CPS levels. As a result, in such 
firms, CPS levels might be more correlated with excess CPS and the governance problems it 
reflects.    
 
E. An Event Study   
 
The preceding subsections document that firms with higher CPS are associated with 
lower firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. In this subsection, we explore whether the release of 
information about changes in CPS is associated with abnormal stock returns. New information 
about the elements necessary for calculating CPS is provided in firms’ proxy statements, which 
are the source of public information about executive compensation.  
Our event study uses the data on proxy filing dates collected by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, 
Gompers, and Metrick (2006). They collect those dates for 1,916 companies for the years 1996 – 
2001. Using the date of the proxy filing as the event date, we calculate the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) around each event date using the market model. The event window is -10 to +10 
days around the event. We use a 21-day window since the proxy date and the filing date are not 
always the same. We assign events to groups according to the change in CPS in the event year 
relative to the previous year.
9  
Table 8 Panel A presents the comparison of the average CAR for firms with decreasing 
versus increasing CPS, as well as the average CAR for the 25% of firms with the most negative 
changes to CPS versus the 25% of firms with the most positive changes to CPS. Comparing 
across groups, the 25% of firms with the highest decreases in CPS had a significantly higher 
CAR than the 25% of firms with the highest increases in CPS. The difference in the 21-day event 
window of 1.2% is statistically and economically significant. Comparing firms with decreasing 
versus increasing CPS, we again find a positive difference in CAR equal to 0.3%, but it is not 
statistically significant.  
                                                  
9  We also weigh the observations by the inverse of the variance of the estimate of the cumulative 
abnormal return to incorporate estimation risk. 
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change in CPS and the CAR (see panel B). As reported in panel C of Table 8, this correlation 
survives after controlling for differences in firm size and book-to-market characteristics. In 
particular, the second regression of CAR also includes the interaction of the change in CPS with 
a dummy indicating whether or not the firm has an Eindex above the sample median. The 
negative relationship between news about increases in CPS and abnormal returns is driven by 
firms with high entrenchment. This is consistent with the previous result that the negative 
correlation of CPS with Q is driven by firms with high entrenchment.  
One interpretation of our results is that the market reacts negatively to news about 
increases in CPS. An alternative interpretation, consistent with the view that CPS levels are 
correlated with worse governance, is that increases in CPS are also correlated with other 
information released in firms’ proxy statements that investors view unfavorably.  
 
IV. CEO CENTRALITY AND COMPANY  DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES   
 
  Thus far we have focused on the relation between CPS and one measure of firm 
outcomes and performance – Tobin’s Q. We now turn to examine whether CPS is associated 
with several other significant aspects of firm behavior and outcomes. This investigation provides 
a robustness check on the conclusion reached in the preceding section regarding the negative 
association between CPS and firm value.   
Furthermore, this inquiry can also help in assessing whether cross-sectional differences 
should be viewed as related to governance/agency problems. While a low Tobin’s Q might be 
due to governance problems, an optimally governed firm might also have low Q due to its 
circumstances. In contrast, some of the aspects to be considered in this section – such as the 
quality of acquisition decisions – are ones that are closely connected to suboptimal decisions.   
We consider in turn five aspects of firm decisions and outcomes: accounting profitability 
(subsection A); quality of acquisition decisions as judged by the market’s reaction to their 
announcement (subsection B); rewards to the CEO for luck in the form of industry-wide positive 
shocks (subsection C); CEO turnover (subsection D); and variability of firm-specific stock 
returns (subsection E).   
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The first dimension of firm outcomes and performance we consider is that of accounting 
profitability. Table 9 reports regressions similar to those in Table 3 with industry-adjusted ROA 
as the dependent variable instead of industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
Panel A reports results of pooled-panel regressions with year fixed effects, and panel B 
reports results of Fama-MacBeth type regressions where we only display the coefficients of 
interest (for brevity). Both panels display six columns with different specifications. In the first 
column, the only independent variable is contemporaneous CPS. In the second column, we add 
to contemporaneous CPS the various standard controls we used in the Q regressions (see Table 
3). The third column differs from the second column in that lagged CPS replaces 
contemporaneous CPS as the independent variable. In the fourth and fifth columns, the 
coefficient of interest is industry-adjusted CPS, with its contemporaneous level used in the 
regression of column 4 and its lagged level in the regression of column 5. Finally, the sixth 
column adds as additional controls the two formal variables that capture some dimensions of 
CEO centrality: a dummy for the CEO being a chair, and a dummy for the CEO being the only 
top executive who is also member of the board. 
In both panels, in each of the six specifications, the coefficient on CPS – whether CPS is 
contemporaneous or lagged, whether it is industry-adjusted or not – is negative and significant 
throughout. The effect of CPS is also economically sizable. For example, using the estimate in 
column 6, a one standard deviation increase in CPS (0.1172) decreases industry-adjusted ROA 
by 1.317% (=0.1172 * -11.239), which is close to the mean value of the sample. The conclusion 
that we draw from this analysis is that CPS is negatively associated with (industry-adjusted) 
accounting profitability, which reinforces our earlier finding that high CPS is associated with 
lower firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
B. CEO Centrality and Acquirer Returns 
           
           In order to gain insight into our finding that high-CPS firms display a lower firm value, 
we follow the study of Masulis et al. (2007). This study investigates the negative correlation 
between firm value and shareholder rights, measured by the governance index or the 
   17entrenchment index, by asking whether shareholder rights are associated with the stock returns 
accompanying bidders’ announcements. The main result is that announcement returns for 
acquirers with high entrenchment level are significantly lower. Using the same data, we add CPS 
in the year prior to the acquisition announcement as an additional explanatory variable. Our test 
asks whether, controlling for the level of entrenchment, high CPS is associated with lower stock 
returns upon the announcement of an acquisition.  
We start with the 3,333 events from Masulis et al. (2007).
10 The sample is based on 
acquisitions recorded by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) between January 1, 1990 and 
December 31, 2003. Since we require that CPS is available at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
takeover bid our sample is reduced to 1,241 events.
11 For this subsample, we find an average 
(standard deviation) abnormal announcement return in the eleven days around the announcement 
date of 0.26% (6.60). These are very similar to the values of 0.22% (6.59) reported by Masulis et 
al. (2007) for the full sample, and it is thus unlikely that the restrictions imposed by the 
availability of CPS introduce any particular bias. 
Table 10 shows the results for two sets of regressions. Regressions 1, 2 and 5 are OLS 
regressions with the abnormal announcement return of the bidder in the eleven days around the 
initial announcement as the dependent variable (cumulative abnormal return, CAR[-5,+5]). 
Regressions 3 and 4 are logit regressions where the dependent variable is equal to one if the 
CAR was negative and zero otherwise. Both types of regressions use robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the firm level to account for correlations if firms make multiple acquisitions. The 
main variable of interest is the CPS of the bidder, computed at the fiscal year end prior to the 
takeover bid.  
In regressions 1, 2, and 5, we find that the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% 
level even after controlling for other determinants found to be significant in Masulis et al. 
(2007). In particular, CPS has additional explanatory power over and above the entrenchment 
Eindex (regression 1) or the governance Gindex (regression 2) and over and above additional 
proxies for power such as the CEO also being the Chair and the CEO being the only director 
among the top five executives.  
                                                  
10 For a detailed description of the sample and the selection process, see Masulis et al. (2007), pages 5-6. 
We thank Ronald Masulis for sharing this data. 
11 We have CPS date from 1993 onwards and only use CPS when the CEO is not changing during the 
year. 
   18Economically, the coefficient on the CPS variable of -0.024 indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in CPS—in this sample that is 12—is associated with a reduction of the 
announcement return of 0.288%  (12 x -0.024). Given the average market value of the bidder in 
our sample of $6,358 million, a one standard deviation increase in CPS results in a loss of about 
$18 million per acquisition announcement. This is in the same order of magnitude as the effect 
from adding one more provision in the Eindex (the coefficient on the Eindex in regression 1 is -
0.497). 
The coefficients on CPS in regressions 3 and 4 are positive and significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that high-CPS firms are more likely to make acquisitions judged by the market to be 
value-destroying, i.e., acquisitions where the bidder announcement return is negative. 
Economically, the coefficient of 0.012 implies that a one standard deviation increase in CPS 
increases the chances of an acquisition being judged to be value-destroying by the market by 
15% (exp(12*0.012)=1.15). This is again of similar importance to increasing the Eindex by one.  
From this analysis, we conclude that one potential reason for the lower valuation of firms 
with high CPS is that high-CPS firms make acquisitions viewed less favorably by the market 
and, in particular, are more likely to make acquisitions viewed as value-destroying by the 
market.   
 
C. CPS and Opportunistic Option Grant Timing 
 
This section considers the relation between CPS and the occurrence of opportunistically 
timed option grants to the CEO. Yermack (1997) showed that option grants are opportunistically 
timed, being systematically followed by abnormal positive stock returns, and Lie (2005) showed 
that the abnormal stock returns around CEO option grants are at least partly due to backdating. 
We examine in this section whether opportunistic timing is related in any systematic fashion to 
CPS.  
We use, as is standard in current work on opportunistic timing, data from Thomson 
Financial’s insider trading database, which is available from 1996 onwards. Bebchuk et al (2006) 
show that lucky grants – grants with an exercise price equal to the lowest price of the month – 
provide a useful proxy for opportunistically timed grants, and we focus below on such lucky 
grants.  
   19We create an independent variable called “luckydum”, a dummy equal to one if the firm 
has granted an option to the CEO on a day where the stock price was the lowest price in the 
calendar month. While such grants might be due to pure luck, Bebchuk et al (2006) shows that 
the incidence of lucky grants is much higher than could be explained by pure luck. Our 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm granted its CEO a lucky grant during the 
year.  
We run three logit regressions. The first is a pooled regression with the standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The second (third) regression is a firm (CEO) fixed effects regression.  
We include standard controls: a dummy that is equal to one for the years are SOX (after 2002) to 
take into account that backdating became more difficult following the passage of SOX; insider 
ownership; size; industry (neweconomy dummy); and a proxy for stock return volatility 
(computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over a year) to account for the fact that 
opportunistic timing is more profitable when stock volatility is high.  
The results are displayed in Table 11. In all three specifications, the coefficient of the 
CPS variable is positive and significant (at 95% confidence). there is a significant positive 
coefficient on the CPS variable indicating that a higher CPS is positively associated with the 
occurrence of opportunistic option grant timing. In untabulated regressions, we replace CPS with 
industry-adjusted CPS and we find that the coefficient of the latter is also positive and 
significant. Overall, our findings indicate that high CPS is correlated with opportunistic timing of 
option grants.  
 
D. Pay for Industry-Wide Shocks  
 
This section considers the relation between CPS and changes in CEO compensation 
accompanying industry-wide value and profitability shocks. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
argue that CEO compensation increases following such industry-wide shocks can be viewed as 
rewards for luck. They further argue and show that the existence and magnitude of such rewards 
is likely to correlate with agency problems and the lack of effective outside checks.
12 Given this 
view, we explore in this section whether CPS is related to such rewards for luck.  
                                                  
12 Of course, there may be exceptions to viewing industry-wide performance shocks as exogenous to the 
firm, especially in cases where the firm is large and has significant market power. In that case, as 
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log of the CEO’s total compensation as the dependent variable. We introduce a dummy variable 
indicating whether there was a positive industry-wide shock in performance, using either Tobin’s 
Q (regressions 1-4) or ROA (regressions 5-8) as measures for performance. As results are robust 
to the choice of which performance metric is used, we discuss the results for industry shocks of 
Tobin’s Q. We control for the level of (or change in) CPS and firm-level Tobin’s Q in all 
specifications in Table 12. 
Column 1 confirms the main result in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) that exogenous, 
positive performance shocks produce, on average, an increase in CEO compensation. Column 2 
and 3 show that this is only the case for firms where CPS is relatively high or went up during the 
year of the industry shock. Thus, rewarding CEOs for luck during an industry-wide positive 
shocks is concentrated among firms with high CPS or CPS increases.  
An important criticism of the Bertrand-Mullainathan view of pay for lucky performance 
is given by Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) and Hubbard (2005). They argue that if the supply 
of CEOs is inelastic, then positive industry-wide shocks increase the relative importance of 
managerial ability and could in equilibrium lead to higher compensation. We investigate this 
point using their view that the supply of CEOs is most inelastic for the largest firms. Regression 
4 shows that our results are not driven by the larger firms for which Himmelberg and Hubbard 
argue that the supply of CEOs is most likely to be inelastic. We find no difference between large 
and small firms in terms of how the reaction of CEO compensation to industry-wide shocks is 
associated with CPS.  
 
E. CEO Centrality and CEO Turnover  
 
We have seen that firms with high CPS have lower Q and lower accounting profitability 
and make acquisition decisions that are viewed less favorably by the market. It could thus be 
                                                                                                                                                              
Bertrand and Mullainathan mention, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) note that relative performance 
evaluation (i.e., filtering out industry-wide shocks) can distort CEO incentives if they can ‘take actions 
that affect the average output of the reference group.’ However, Bertrand and Mullainathan do not find 
evidence that this is a severe problem when using industry-wide performance shocks, as their results for 
that measure are very similar to using shocks that are more clearly beyond the CEO’s control, such as oil 
price and exchange rate shocks. 
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least partly due to agency problems in the first place, which could make CEO replacement more 
difficult and unlikely. We explore this possibility by testing whether, controlling for 
performance, CEO turnover is related to CPS.  
Table 13 displays the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is equal to 
one if there is a CEO turnover in year t. We use the ExecuComp dataset to identify CEO 
turnover, which we define as taking place if the CEO title in this dataset has changed from one 
person to another. We find 1,326 turnovers in our sample of 11,221 firm-years with available 
data on the prior-year CPS.  
The independent variable of interest in the base regression of column 1 is the industry-
adjusted CPS at the end of the preceding year. The control variables include the stock return of 
the company during the year and dummies for the year of the CEO’s service (we do not use 
tenure as a continuous variable since its effect on turnover might not be monotonic). The 
coefficient on industry-adjusted CPS is negative and significant, indicating that CEOs with high 
CPS are less likely to be replaced.  
In column 2, we add an interaction between the industry-adjusted CPS and the stock  
return. The question is whether high-CPS CEOs are less likely to turn over even if their stock 
performance is bad. The coefficient on the interaction variable is positive, and marginally 
significant, indicating that turnover is less performance-sensitive for high-CPS CEOs.  
To assess the economic significance, we consider the effect of a 10% increase in 
industry-adjusted CPS on the performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. The coefficient on stock 
return is -0.404 implying that with a -50% stock return, CEO turnover probability increases by 
22% (exp(-0.5*-0.404) - 1). The coefficient on the interaction term between the stock return and 
industry-adjusted CPS is 1.684, implying a reduction in the performance sensitivity of 8% (exp(-
0.5*1.684*0.1) - 1), or about a one-third reduction in the performance sensitivity of turnover.  
Following Jenter and Kanaan (2006), regression 3 splits the stock return into firm-
specific and market returns, where firm specific returns are defined as the difference between the 
overall stock return and the market return. Consistent with Jenter and Kanaan (2006) we also 
find that CEO turnover is sensitive to market returns, albeit not significantly so. The main 
conclusion is that CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm specific returns for CEOs with a high 
industry-adjusted CPS. If a lower performance sensitivity is an indication of more agency 
   22problems (e.g., Kaplan and Minton (2006)), then our findings here could help explain the overall 
negative association between CPS and firm value.  
 
F. CEO Centrality and the Variability of Firm-Specific Returns  
 
We conclude our investigation of the relation between CPS and firm outcomes by 
examining the relation between CPS and the variability of firm-specific stock returns. This 
variability reflects the frequency with which and the extent to which investors make revisions in 
their estimate of the firm’s prospects.  
A priori, theory does not provide us with an unambiguous prediction about the 
relationship between CEO centrality and the variability of firm-specific stock returns. On the one 
hand, it might be argued that such centrality should be associated with lower variability for two 
reasons. To begin, a CEO playing a dominant role in the firm’s decision-making might lead to 
decisions that are more conservative (risk-averse); the CEO may want to play it safe to reduce 
the chance of a negative stock return which might lead to dismissal. Because the CEO’s 
compensation and tenure are more sensitive to the firm’s performance than those of other top 
executives, the CEO might have an especially strong incentive to avoid risks and, in the words of 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), “enjoy the quiet life.” Second, if one person plays a dominant 
role in the firm’s decision-making, this could lower the market’s uncertainty about the firm’s 
strategy and thus decrease the variability of the firm-specific returns.  
On the other hand, Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) and Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 
(2005) argue that firms with powerful CEOs would tend to make less “balanced” decisions 
relative to those reached by consensus and coalition-building within a team. On this view, 
dominant CEOs can be expected to lead to more extreme outcomes and thus be associated with 
higher variability of firm-specific stock returns. 
Table 14 presents the results of Glejser’s (1969) heteroskedasticity test. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of monthly residual returns, where we use the four-factor Fama-
French model to compute residuals. The pooled panel regressions either include industry fixed 
effects (clustering standard errors by industry) or firm fixed effects (clustering standard errors by 
firm). As independent variables, we include CPS alongside several other governance variables 
(founder dummy, CEO as chair dummy, CEO tenure, CEO stock ownership) and other firm 
   23characteristics (leverage, firm size, firm age and capital expenditures). Our specification closely 
follows the heteroskedasticity test in Adams et al. (2005) with CPS as an additional variable. 
We find a negative relation between CPS and firm-specific variability. This finding is 
robust to firm or industry fixed effects and to the inclusion of the other governance variables. To 
the extent that the lower idiosyncratic volatility of high-CPS firms is due to the tendency of their 
CEOs to avoid firm-specific volatility which imposes risk-bearing costs on them but not on 
diversified investors, this evidence is consistent with the view that the association between high 
CPS and lower firm value is related to governance and agency problems. 
In addition to CPS, the dummy of whether the CEO chairs the board also has a negative 
coefficient, consistent with the view that CEO centrality is associated with lower variability. The 
CEO’s ownership stake and CEO tenure have a non-linear relationship with variability: the first 
moment has a positive coefficient and the second moment a negative (though significance 





In this paper, we investigate CEO centrality as proxied by CPS, the fraction of top-five 
compensation captured by the CEO. We find that cross-sectional differences in CEO centrality 
are associated with lower Tobin's Q, lower accounting profitability, less favorable market 
reaction to acquisition announcements made by the firm, more luck-based pay, less CEO 
turnover controlling for performance and tenure, and lower variability of firm-specific stock 
returns.  
Beyond our particular findings, our general conclusion is that CEO centrality is an aspect 
of firm governance and management to which financial economists should pay attention in their 
future work. Research on the effects of governance arrangements and management processes -- 
                                                  
13  With respect to variables other than the CPS, our results correspond partly to, and differ partly from, 
those in Adams et al. (2005). For example, in our estimates the dummies for CEO-founder and CEO as 
the only executive on the board are not significant, while CEO ownership is consistently significant. 
These differences might be partly due to the difference in samples. Our sample uses a longer time period 
(1992-2005 rather than 1992-1999 as in Adams et al.) and uses all firms in ExecuComp rather than those 
in the 1998 Fortune 500 only. 
   24as well as research on a wide range of aspects of firm behavior and decision-making -- should 
consider using CEO centrality as either a necessary control or a subject of investigation. 
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   29TABLE 1: CPS BY INDUSTRY 
 
The table displays industry average and median CPS where industry is defined as the 12 Fama-French 
industries. The averages are computed using the panel data set of 12,011 observations (Obs). Within 
industry variation is computed as the standard deviation of the CPS within an industry. The regression 
coefficients are from a tobit regression with CPS as the dependent variable and industry dummies. The hold 
out industry is Energy. P-values of the coefficients are also reported. 
 










Non Durable Consumer Goods  1018  0.335  0.109  0.330  -0.016  0.009  
Durable Consumer Goods  422  0.363  0.121  0.359  0.011  0.141  
Manufacturing  1902  0.354  0.106  0.353  0.003  0.602  
Energy  520  0.351  0.104  0.344        
Chemical  477  0.374  0.107  0.370  0.022  0.003  
Business Equipment  1782  0.321  0.132  0.304  -0.031  0.000  
Telecom  267  0.311  0.118  0.300  -0.040  0.000  
Utilities  1080  0.351  0.087  0.347  0.000  0.974  
Shops  1491  0.331  0.116  0.321  -0.021  0.000  
Health  819  0.354  0.128  0.340  0.002  0.704  
Money  922  0.342  0.128  0.330  -0.009  0.138  
Other  1311  0.343  0.125  0.330  -0.009  0.138  
Average      0.344              
Standard deviation      0.018              
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TABLE 2: UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of 
equity, all divided by the book value of assets. The industry adjustment is made at the four-digit SIC level. 
Industry-adjusted ROA is the return on assets computed as net income divided by book value of assets 
adjusted by the median ROA of the firms in Compustat in a given four-digit SIC industry and year. It is 
expressed in percentage terms. Eindex is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk and Cohen (2004). Log book 
value is the log of the book value of assets. Insider ownership is the fraction of shares held by insiders as 
reported by Execucomp. Capex/Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Leverage is the long-
term debt to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. If R&D is missing, it is set to zero and the dummy 
variable R&D missing is set to one. Company age is computed as the current year minus the year in which 
the company was first listed on CRSP. We present the number of observations, the overall sample mean 
and standard deviation, as well the mean of the variables for two subsets. The first one is the subset of firms 
with industry-adjusted CPS bigger than zero, the second is where the industry-adjusted CPS is below or 
equal to zero. The last column reports the p-value of a mean comparison between the two subsamples. 
 







Ind-adj Tobin's Q  12011  0.359  1.119  0.343  0.374  0.091  
Ind-adj ROA  12011  1.462  10.122  1.220  1.699  0.009  
Eindex  12011  2.152  1.308  2.225  2.081  0.005  
Log book value  12011  7.513  1.606  7.555  7.473  0.000  
Insider ownership  12011  0.063  0.073  0.057  0.068  0.000  
insider ownership2  12011  0.009  0.033  0.008  0.011  0.000  
Capex/Assets  12011  0.185  2.178  0.168  0.202  0.383  
Leverage  12011  0.205  0.169  0.209  0.201  0.006  
R&D  12011  0.124  3.925  0.114  0.133  0.790  
R&D missing  12011  0.481  0.500  0.474  0.489  0.098  
Company Age  12011  25.766  19.235  26.381  25.168  0.000  
 
 TABLE 3: RELATION BETWEEN TOBIN’S Q AND CPS 
 
This table presents year fixed effects regressions in columns 1-4 and 7, and Fama-MacBeth type regressions in columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the four-
digit SIC industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided 
by the book value of assets. CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of all top executives’ total compensation, and is expressed as decimals here. 
Total compensation is data item TDC1 from ExecuComp. The industry adjustment in CPS is made at the four-digit SIC level. Eindex is the entrenchment index of 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2004). Log book value is the log of the book value of assets. Insider ownership is the fraction of shares held by insiders as reported by 
Execucomp. ROA is the return on assets computed as net income divided by book value of assets. Capex/Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. 
Leverage is the long-term debt to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. If R&D is missing, it is set to zero and the dummy variable R&D missing is set to one. 
Company age is computed as the current year minus the year in which the company was first listed on CRSP. Column 7 includes two additional variables. 
CEOChair is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman and zero otherwise. CEO is only director is a dummy equal to one if none of the other top four 
executives is on the Board, and zero otherwise. The sample size is smaller for data availability reasons related to the Board memberships of the other top 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CPS  -0.256     -0.246   -0.282 
  (3.20)**     (2.279)*   (2.97)** 
CPS,  t-1   -0.475     -0.431 
   (4.91)**     (4.070)** 
Ind-adj CPS total comp      -0.108   
    ( 1 . 9 2 ) $    
Ind-adj  CPS,  t-1     -0.344 
     ( 3 . 4 8 ) * *  
Eindex  -0.099 -0.097 -0.099 -0.098 -0.093 -0.086 -0.099 
  (13.55)** (11.21)** (13.66)** (11.33)** (9.260)** (7.667)** (11.06)** 
Log book value  -0.045  -0.038  -0.045 -0.038 -0.040 -0.031 -0.019 
  (6.93)** (4.88)** (6.93)**    (4.92)** (4.386)**  (2.778)**  (2.40)* 
Insider  Ownership  0.592   0.632   1.270   0.807 
  (2.04)*   (2.17)*   (3.169)**   (2.20)* 
Insider  Ownership2  -2.267   -2.319   -3.899   -3.395 
  (3.56)**   (3.64)**   (4.561)**   (4.01)** 
Insider  Ownership,  t-1   0.413   0.454   0.839 
   (1.24)   (1.36)   (2.751)** 
Insider  Ownership2,  t-1   -2.113   -2.157   -2.528 
   (2.96)**   (3.02)**   (3.677)** 
ROA,  t  3.759 4.089 3.743 4.074 4.565 5.159 4.568 
  (37.41)** (32.70)** (37.27)** (32.58)** (14.810)**  (13.625)**  (35.61)** 
Capex/assets  0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.041 0.056 0.004 
  (0.76) (1.05) (0.79) (1.05) (1.536)  (1.184)  (0.99) 
Leverage  -0.715 -0.739 -0.722 -0.750 -0.615 -0.610 -0.941 
  (12.25)** (10.59)** (12.38)** (10.75)** (6.381)** (4.038)** (12.97)** 
R&D  0.027 0.017 0.027 0.017 0.301 0.403 0.297 
  (11.28)**  (7.08)** (11.21)**  (7.04)** (3.286)**  (4.264)**  (15.49)** 
R&D  missing  dum  -0.190 -0.192 -0.190 -0.193 -0.149 -0.134 -0.212 
  (9.91)** (8.51)** (9.92)** (8.51)** (3.327)**  (2.866)**  (9.09)** 
Company  age  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (5.79)** (5.26)** (5.92)** (5.43)** (5.403)**  (3.071)**  (4.85)** 
C E O C h a i r   d u m         - 0 . 0 0 7  
        ( 0 . 2 6 )  
CEO  only  Dir  dum        -0.013 
        ( 0 . 5 4 )  
Observations  12011 8661  12011 8661  12  12  8771 
R-squared  0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18     0.20 
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TABLE 4: TOBIN’S Q AND CPS CONTROLLING FOR LAGGED TOBIN’S Q 
   
This table presents year fixed effects regressions in columns 1-4 and 7, and Fama-MacBeth type regressions in columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the four-
digit SIC industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided 
by the book value of assets. CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of all top executives’ total compensation, and is expressed as decimals here. 
Total compensation is data item TDC1 from ExecuComp. The industry adjustment in CPS is made at the four-digit SIC level. Eindex is the entrenchment index of 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2004). Log book value is the log of the book value of assets. Insider ownership is the fraction of shares held by insiders as reported by 
Execucomp. ROA is the return on assets computed as net income divided by book value of assets. Capex/Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. 
Leverage is the long-term debt to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. If R&D is missing, it is set to zero and the dummy variable R&D missing is set to one. 
Company age is computed as the current year minus the year in which the company was first listed on CRSP. Column 7 includes two additional variables. 
CEOChair is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman and zero otherwise. CEO is only director is a dummy equal to one if none of the other top four 
executives is on the board, and zero otherwise. The sample size is smaller for data availability reasons related to the board memberships of the other top executives.   
$, *, ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:    Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)       (6)  (7) 
CPS,  t  -0.236     -0.191      -0.243 
  (3.99)**     (2.659)**      (3.49)** 
CPS,  t-1   -0.255     -0.190 
   (2.89)**     (2.083)* 
Ind-adj  CPS,  t    -0.194     
    ( 3 . 2 2 ) * *      
Ind-adj  CPS,  t-1     -0.219    
     ( 2 . 4 4 ) *     
Ind-adj Tobin's Q, t-1  0.554    0.554    0.668      0.529 
  (107.00)**   (107.07)**   (13.220)**     (90.98)** 
Ind-adj Tobin's Q, t-2    0.393    0.393    0.521 
   (58.92)**   (59.00)**   (10.932)** 
Eindex  -0.025 -0.038 -0.025 -0.039 -0.017 -0.021 -0.024 
  (4.56)** (4.89)** (4.64)** (4.95)** (2.571)**  (2.797)**  (3.67)** 
Log book value  -0.025  -0.019  -0.025 -0.019 -0.012 -0.004 -0.018 
  (5.21)** (2.72)** (5.22)** (2.72)** (1.566)  (0.357)  (3.19)** 
Insider  Ownership  0.080   0.091   0.162     0.148 
  (0.36)   (0.41)   (0.599)      (0.55) 
Insider  Ownership2  -0.682   -0.689   -0.682     -1.029 
  (1.33)   (1.34)   (1.559)      (1.61) 
Insider  Ownership,  t-1   0.119   0.128   0.279 
   (0.39)   (0.42)   (0.993) 
Insider  Ownership2,  t-1   -1.057   -1.060   -0.953) 
   (1.57)   (1.58)   (2.000)* 
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ROA,  t  1.598 2.817 1.590 2.808 1.292 2.624 2.126 
  (20.82)** (24.84)** (20.73)** (24.79)** (5.046)** (11.165)**  (21.82) 
Capex/assets  0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.044 0.001 
  (0.13) (0.93) (0.14) (0.93) (0.115)  (1.112)  (0.35) 
Leverage  -0.295 -0.461 -0.300 -0.466 -0.215 -0.347 -0.429 
  (6.83)** (7.30)** (6.95)** (7.39)** (2.479)**  (3.299)**  (8.17)** 
R&D  0.012 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.097 0.727 0.106 
  (7.20)** (7.54)** (7.17)** (7.51)** (2.112)* (1.890)$ (6.13)** 
R&D  missing  dum  -0.040 -0.079 -0.041 -0.079 -0.024 -0.025 -0.045 
  (2.86)** (3.88)** (2.88)** (3.89)** (1.287)  (0.626)  (2.68)** 
Company  age  0.000 -0.000  0.000 -0.000  0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.79) (0.35) (0.65) (0.46) (1.278)  (0.621)  (0.50) 
CEOChair  dum           0.001 
           ( 0 . 0 4 )  
CEO  only  Dir  dum           -0.021 
           ( 1 . 2 2 )  
Observations  10793 7437  10793 7437  12  11    8319   
R-squared  0.60 0.44 0.60 0.44      0.60 
 TABLE 5: CHANGES IN CPS AND CHANGES IN TOBIN’S Q 
 
The table shows year fixed effects regression results where the dependent variable is the percentage change 
in Tobin’s Q from t-1 to t. The independent variable of interest is the percentage change in CPS from t-1 to 
t. The second regression controls for lagged variables similar to Table 3. The third regression uses control 
variables defined as percentage changes in those respective variables. Column 4 includes two additional 
variables. CEOChair is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman and zero otherwise. CEO is 
only director is a dummy equal to one if none of the other top four executives is on the board, and zero 
otherwise. The sample size is smaller for data availability reasons related to the board memberships of the 
other top executives.    $, *, ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable:    Percentage Change in Tobin’s Q from t-1 to t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage Change in CPS  -0.075  -0.082  -0.075  -0.057 
  (2.05)* (2.10)* (1.92)$ (1.32) 
Eindex, t-1    0.003   
   (0.27)   
Log book value    0.019   
   (1.75)$   
Insider Ownership, t-1    0.039   
   (0.08)   
Insider Ownership2, t-1    0.508   
   (0.48)   
ROA, t-1    0.196   
   (1.06)   
Capex/Assets, t-1    -0.009   
   (1.14)   
Leverage, t-1    -0.127   
   (1.24)   
R&D, t-1    -0.013   
   (0.64)   
R&D missing dum, t-1    -0.054   
   (1.68)$   
Company  age,  t-1    0.000 0.001 0.001 
    (0.26) (0.75) (0.75) 
Change in Eindex      0.047  0.075 
    (1.08)  (1.50) 
Change in insider ownership      -0.926  -0.800 
    (1.91)$  (1.46) 
Change in insider ownership2      1.870  0.327 
    (1.49)  (0.21) 
Change in Capex/Assets      -0.003  -0.003 
    (0.60)  (0.60) 
Change in Leverage      -0.375  -0.135 
    (1.84)$  (0.58) 
Change in ROA      0.292  0.209 
    (1.44)  (0.87) 
Change in R&D      0.011  0.040 
    (2.42)*  (1.33) 
CEOChair  dum     -0.028 
     ( 0 . 6 4 )  
CEO only Dir dum        -0.014 
     ( 0 . 3 8 )  
Observations  9526 8756 8751 6731 
R-squared  0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002
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TABLE 6:  DOES LOW TOBIN’S Q LEAD TO INCREASES IN CPS? 
 
The table shows average values and p-values of differences for a sample of 1,326 firms where the CEO changed during 
our sample period. The year of the CEO change is denoted by time t. The three variables of interest are the CPS of the 
new CEO in his/her first full year in charge (t+1), conditional on the CEO being in office for the full year. The second 
variable subtracts the industry median CPS of surviving CEOs in year t+1 from the new CEO’s CPS at t+1. The 
industry adjustment is at the 2-digit SIC level. The third variable is the change in the CPS from the former CEO to the 
new CEO. The former CEO’s CPS is measured in year t-1, the last full year in office, conditional on the CEO being in 
charge for the full year. The averages of these variables are displayed for subsamples. The first sample split is at 








Change in CPS   
t-1 to t+1  Obs   
TQ>=1  33.48  -0.21  4.01  1,124  
TQ<1  34.44  0.76  5.94  202  
p-value difference  0.26  0.26  0.11     
              
Ind-adj TQ>=0  33.56  -0.16  4.21  725  
Ind-adj TQ<0  33.67  0.05  4.41  601  
p-value difference  0.83  0.73  0.82     
  
  TABLE 7:  ENTRENCHMENT AND THE RELATION BETWEEN TOBIN’S Q AND CPS 
This table presents year fixed effects regressions in columns 1-4 and Fama-MacBeth type regressions in columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the four-digit 
SIC industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the 
book value of assets. CPS is the ratio of CEO total compensation to the sum of all top executives’ total compensation, and is expressed as decimals here. Total 
compensation is data item TDC1 from ExecuComp. The industry adjustment in CPS is made at the four-digit SIC level. Eindex is the entrenchment index of 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2004). Log book value is the log of the book value of assets. Insider ownership is the fraction of shares held by insiders as reported by 
Execucomp. ROA is the return on assets computed as net income divided by book value of assets. Capex/Assets is the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. 
Leverage is the long-term debt to assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to sales. If R&D is missing, it is set to zero and the dummy variable R&D missing is set to one. 
Company age is computed as the current year minus the year in which the company was first listed on CRSP.  $, *, ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:    Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
CPS,  t  0.007      
  (0.04)     
CPS, t-1    0.066     
   (0.31)     
Ind-adj CPS, t      0.241    0.239 
     (1.35)   (0.997) 
Ind-adj CPS, t-1        0.281    0.423 
      (1.27)    (0.934) 
Eindex * CPS, t  -0.115       
  (1.88)$     
Eindex * CPS, t-1    -0.311     
   (3.41)**     
Eindex * ind-adj CPS, t      -0.143    -0.166 
     (1.92)$   (1.680)$ 
Eindex * ind-adj CPS, t-1        -0.347    -0.409 
      (3.70)**    (2.223)* 
Eindex  -0.069  0.003  -0.108 -0.101 -0.134  -0.247 
  (2.61)** (0.09) (12.20)**  (9.26)**  (1.925)$ (1.814)$ 
Log book value  -0.049  -0.041  -0.049 -0.041 -0.043  -0.033 
  (6.23)**  (4.27)** (6.21)** (4.27)** (3.695)**  (1.996)* 
Insider  Ownership  0.868   0.921   1.624   
  (2.47)*   (2.62)**   (3.837)** 
Insider  Ownership2  -2.810   -2.881   -4.538 
  (3.65)**   (3.74)**   (4.918) 
Insider Ownership, t-1    0.587    0.643    1.163 
    (1.43)   (1.56)   (3.811)** 
Insider Ownership2, t-1    -2.504    -2.572    -3.147 
    (2.83)**   (2.91)**   (4.953)** 
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ROA,  t  4.036  4.434 4.017 4.415 4.850  5.528 
  (33.25)**  (28.65)** (33.13)** (28.54)** (14.190)**  (12.945) 
Capex/assets  0.003  0.005 0.003 0.005 0.041  0.056 
  (0.53)  (0.77) (0.55) (0.77) (1.494)  (1.101) 
Leverage -0.685  -0.732  -0.693 -0.745 -0.602  -0.639 
  (9.72)**  (8.47)** (9.84)** (8.63)** (4.496)**  (3.024)** 
R&D  0.040  0.029 0.039 0.029 0.324  0.445 
  (13.75)**  (9.80)** (13.68)**  (9.79)** (3.178)**  (4.147)** 
R&D missing dum  -0.224  -0.231  -0.224 -0.233 -0.180  -0.158 
  (9.65)**  (8.27)** (9.68)** (8.30)** (3.131)**  (2.630) 
Company age  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 -0.004 -0.003  -0.004 
  (5.95)**  (5.27)** (6.04)** (5.42)** (4.574)**  (2.687)** 
Observations  12011  8661 12011  8661 12  11 
R-squared  0.14  0.15 0.14 0.15 TABLE 8: ABNORMAL RETURNS AROUND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF CPS CHANGES 
 
We use the date of the proxy filing as the event date, where the proxy dates are from Dlugosz et al. (2006), who collect 
proxy dates in the years 1996-2001 for 1,916 companies. We find 4,062 firm-years with available data to compute the 
change in CPS from year t-1 to year t and with sufficient data available on CRSP to compute abnormal returns. We 
calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the event using the market model. The event window is -10 to 
+10 days around the event, using a 21-day window since the proxy date and the filing date are not always the same. We 
weigh the observations by the inverse of the variance of the estimate of the cumulative abnormal return. CPS is based 
on total compensation and is expressed as a percentage. Panel A presents mean comparisons between samples that 
increase (top quartile) or decrease (lowest quartile) their CPS from one year to the next. Panel B reports the correlation 
coefficient between CPS and CAR, with the p-value in brackets. Panel C reports a weighted least squares regression 
where the dependent variable is CAR. The independent variables are the change in CPS from year t-1 to year t, firm 
size measured as the log of the book value of assets and the book-to-market ratio, both measured at t. Observations are 
weighed by the inverse of the variance of the estimate of the cumulative abnormal return. $, *, ** indicate significance 




Panel A: Mean comparisons    
  Average CAR  Number of observations 
For Firms increasing CPS  0.699%**  2062 
For Firms decreasing CPS  1.028%**  2000 
Difference (decrease-increase):  0.329%   
    
Top quartile change in CPS  0.531%  1015 
Lowest quartile change in CPS  1.691%**  1015 
Difference (lowest-top):  1.160%**   
 
 
Panel B: Correlation coefficient 
Correlation between the change in CPS and CAR (p-value):  -0.035 (0.02) 
 
 
Panel C: Regression Analysis    
Dependent Variable  CAR[-10,+10] in % 
    
Independent Variables:     
Change in CPS (t-1, t)  -0.0328  -0.0044 
 (2.03)*  (0.21) 
Change in CPS    -0.0525 
         * Dum(Eindex>median)    (1.86)$ 
Dum(Eindex>median)   -0.3907 
   (1.24) 
Firm Size  -0.1299  -0.1014 
 (1.07)  (0.89) 
Book-to-Market 0.1448  0.1514 
 (1.61)  (2.02)** 
Constant 1.610  1.357 
 (1.79)$  (1.56) 
R-squared 0.002  0.003 





   40TABLE 9:   CPS AND ACCOUNTING PROFITABILITY 
 
 
Panel A shows year fixed regression results using the industry adjusted return-on-assets (net income divided by book value of assets) 
as the dependent variable. The industry adjustment is made at the 4-digit SIC level by subtracting the industry median ROA from the 
firm’s ROA. The industry median ROA is based on the universe of Compustat firms in a given year. The dependent variable is 
winzorized at the 1% and 99% level and is expressed in percentage terms. Panel B shows the same regression specifications except 
that we use Fama-MacBeth type regressions instead of year fixed effects regressions. We only report the coefficients and t-statistics 
of the CPS variables for brevity. $, *, **  indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Year Fixed Effects Regressions 
Dependent Variable:  Ind-adj ROA (in percentage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPS,  t  -10.469  -9.105     -11.239 
  (14.01)**  (11.72)**     (12.88)** 
CPS,  t-1    -2.388    
    (2.89)**    
Ind-adj  CPS,  t     -9.141   
     (11.54)**   
Ind-adj  CPS,  t-1      -2.055 
      ( 2 . 4 3 ) *  
Eindex    0.042 0.032 0.023 0.026 0.099 
    (0.58) (0.42) (0.32) (0.35) (1.19) 
Log  book  value    0.600 0.616 0.599 0.616 0.272 
    (9.43)** (9.20)** (9.42)** (9.19)** (3.69)** 
Insider  Ownership   13.988 17.510 13.939 17.607 15.197 
    (4.89)** (5.45)** (4.87)** (5.48)** (4.45)** 
Insider  Ownership2    -15.596 -22.258 -15.136 -22.308 -23.729 
    (2.46)* (2.97)**  (2.39)* (2.97)**  (2.99)** 
Capex/assets    0.026 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.022 
    (0.50) (0.54) (0.53) (0.55) (0.43) 
Leverage    -11.584 -11.713 -11.774 -11.758 -11.003 
    (20.82)** (19.84)** (21.17)** (19.92)** (16.80)** 
R&D    -0.245 -0.196 -0.246 -0.197 -2.911 
    (10.69)** (8.53)**  (10.73)** (8.55)**  (16.91) 
R&D  missing  dum    -0.943 -1.072 -0.968 -1.077 -1.573 
    (5.07)** (5.47)** (5.21)** (5.49)** (7.36)** 
Company  age    0.010 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.013 
    (2.00)* (1.72)$ (1.58)  (1.62)  (2.15)* 
CEOChair  dum       0.198 
       ( 0 . 8 2 )  
CEO  only  Chair  dum       -0.894 
       ( 4 . 1 4 ) * *  
Observations  12011 12011 10936 12011 10936 8775 
R-squared  0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.10
   41Panel B: Fama-MacBeth Type Regressions (only CPS coefficients reported) 
  
Dependent Variable:  Ind-adj ROA (in percentage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CPS,  t  -11.328  -10.192     -11.588 
  (8.936)**  (6.854)**     (12.369)** 
CPS,  t-1    -4.959    
    (3.291)**    
Ind-adj  CPS,  t     -9.948   
     (7.155)**   
Ind-adj  CPS,  t-1      -4.556 
      ( 3 . 3 6 5 ) * *  
Additional  Controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  12 12 11 12 11 9
   42TABLE 10: CPS AND ACQUIRER RETURNS 
The sample consists of 1,241 takeover announcement events from the sample of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). The dependent variable is 
the cumulative abnormal announcement return of the bidder in the eleven days around the announcement (CAR[-5,+5]) in regressions 1, 2 
and 5, and a dummy equal to one if the CAR is negative in regressions 3 and 4. Regressions 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are OLS (logit) regressions 
with robust standard errors and errors clustered at the firm level. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. CPS is the ratio of CEO to 
the sum of all top executives’ compensation. CPS is based on total compensation as measured by data item TDC1 from ExecuComp 
containing salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other total incentive compensation. G-index is the governance index of Gompers, et al. (2003). E-index 
is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al (2004). ‘Fraction Blockowners’ is the fraction of the shares outstanding owned by institutional 
blockholders. Log book value bidder is the book value of the bidder at the end of the fiscal year prior to the takeover. Relative deal size is 
the ratio of the deal value (from SDC) to the market value of equity of the bidder at the fiscal year end prior to the takeover. Tobin’s Q is the 
market-to-book ratio of the bidder at the fiscal year end prior to the takeover. Leverage is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to assets. 
Herfindahl is based on sales of firms in the same four-digit SIC industry. Run-up is the cumulative stock return in the year prior to the 
takeover. ‘High tech industry dummy’ is equal to 1 if the firm operates in an industry with four-digit SIC code of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 
3577, 3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, or 7373. Cash used (stock only) dummy is equal to one if the bidder pays at 
least a part in cash (all in equity). The status of the target is private, public or subsidiary indicated by the respected dummy variables. $, *, 
** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Year dummies and a constant are included but omitted to save space. 
Column 5 includes two additional variables. CEOChair is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman and zero otherwise. CEO 
is only director is a dummy equal to one if none of the other top four executives is on the board, and zero otherwise. The sample size is 
smaller for data availability reasons related to the board memberships of the other top executives. The r-squared reported for the logit 
regression is a pseudo r-square. 
 
Dependent Variable:   CAR [-5,+5]            Dummy=1 if CAR Negative           CAR [-5,+5] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CPS  (Bidder)  -0.024 -0.024 0.011  0.011  -0.035 
  (1.74)$ (1.70)$ (2.21)* (2.18)* (1.92)$ 
Eindex  (Bidder)  -0.497   0.098   -0.397 
  (4.14)**   (2.19)*   (2.71)** 
Gindex  (Bidder)   -0.180   0.029 
   (2.77)**   (1.30) 
Fraction Blockholders (Bidder)  0.025 0.028 -0.013  -0.014  0.017 
  (0.97) (1.08) (1.20) (1.28) (0.44) 
Log book value (Bidder)  -0.270  -0.238  0.073  0.067  -0.293 
  (2.36)* (2.10)* (1.70)$ (1.57)  (1.98)** 
Relative Deal Size  -0.770 -0.786 0.244  0.246  -0.471 
  (0.62) (0.62) (0.80) (0.80) (0.28) 
Tobin's  Q  (Bidder)  -0.019 0.017  -0.008 -0.016 -0.040 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.37) (0.22) 
Leverage (Bidder)  2.189  2.141  -0.162 -0.143 2.897 
  (1.67)$  (1.63) (0.35) (0.31) (1.69)$ 
Herfindahl  (Bidder)  5.311  5.950  -2.163 -2.295 5.675 
  (1.96)$ (2.13)* (1.65)$ (1.74)$ (1.59) 
Run-up  (Bidder)  -1.375  -1.387  0.200  0.199  -1.430 
  (2.29)* (2.33)* (1.30)  (1.32)  (2.14)* 
High tech dummy  (Bidder)  -1.058  -0.989  0.226  0.206  -1.239 
  (1.67)$  (1.56) (1.34) (1.21) (1.68)$ 
Cash Used dummy  0.005  0.006  -0.000  -0.000  0.009 
  (1.11) (1.19) (0.16) (0.20) (1.49) 
Stock Only dummy  -0.906  -0.896  0.510 0.504 -0.719 
  (1.80)$ (1.76)$ (2.85)**  (2.81)**  (1.07) 
Private  (Target)  1.723 1.262 -0.389  -0.290  1.839 
  (0.46) (0.31) (0.25) (0.18) (0.47) 
Subsidiary  (Target)  2.311  1.894  -0.572  -0.481  2.535 
  (0.62) (0.46) (0.37) (0.30) (0.66) 
Public  (Target)    0.262  -0.212 -0.027 0.076  0.078 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
CEOChair  dum      0.615 
      ( 1 . 0 7 )  
CEO  only  Dir  dum      0.299 
      ( 0 . 7 0 )  
Constant  3.101 3.750 -0.969  -1.041  -0.493 
  (0.78) (0.85) (0.61) (0.61) (0.12) 
Observations  1241 1241 1241 1241 857 
R-squared  0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.11 
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 luckydum 
  (1) (2)
CPS 3.607 
 (15.97)**  (18.07)**
SOX 0.577 
 (10.40)**  (1.81)
N
TABLE 11: CPS AND OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING OF OPTION GRANTS  
 
The sample consists of 11,712 firm-year observations between 1996-2004. The dependent variable 
is a dummy equal to one if the firm has provided at least one option grant to the CEO during the 
year where the grant day was the day with the lowest stock price of the month. Option grant 
information is from Financial’s insider trading database. For details on the definition of 
the variable and the sample, see Bebchuk et al (2007). The independent variables are: CPS, the 
ratio of CEO to the sum of all top executives’ compensation. CPS is based on total compensation as 
measured by data item TDC1 from ExecuComp containing salary, bonus, other annual 
compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other total incentive compensation; SOX, a dummy equal to 
one if the year of the option grant is after 2002; Neweconomy, is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm 
operates in an industry with four-digit SIC code of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 3661, 3674, 
4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, or 7373; Insider Ownership, ); Insider ownership is the 
fraction of shares held by insiders as reported by Execucomp; Log book value is the log of the book 
value of assets; Eindex is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk and Cohen (2004); Stdev Stock 
Return is the standard deviation of daily stock return over a calendar year. The first regression is a 
logit regression with error clustered at the firm level. The second regression is a firm-fixed effects 
logit regressions, the third is a CEO fixed effects logit regression.  $, *, ** indicate significance at 




7.244  9.259 
  (17.69)** 
0.160  -0.025 
$  (0.23) 
eweconomy 0.333   
 (3.31)** 
Insider Ownership  1.816  1.685 
 (1.79)$  (1.00)
Insider Ownership2  -2.227  -1.518 
 (0.94)  (0.46)
Log book value  0.005  0.422 
 (0.27)  (4.07)**
Eindex 0.020 
 (0.90)  (0.80)
Stdev Stock Return  -0.186  -0.345 
  (5.99)** (7.57)**
Constant -3.195   
 (14.27)** 
Observations  11712 11712 11712 
 
   
-1.803 
  (0.82) 
6.565 
  (1.37) 
0.361 
  (2.69)** 
0.059  0.072 
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TABLE 12:  CPS AND COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRY-WIDE SHOCKS 
 
This table presents industry fixed effects regressions. All industry groups are defined at the four-digit SIC level. The dependent variable is the log of the CEO total 
compensation (data item TDC1 from ExecuComp). ‘Industry Average TQ UP dum t-1 to t’ is a dummy equal to one if the industry average Tobin’s Q went up over the last 
year. ‘CPS up from t-1 to t dum’ is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s CPS increased the previous year. ‘Industry Average ROA UP dum t-1 to t’ is a dummy equal to one if the 
industry average ROA went up over the last year. ‘Small dum’ is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s market cap is below the median for that year. See previous table descriptions for 
the remaining variable descriptions. *, ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:        ln(Total  Compensation)t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Industry Average TQ UP dum t-1 to t  0.043  -0.074  -0.024  -0.083         
  (2.12)**  (1.22) (0.59) (1.27)        
Industry Average TQ UP dum t-1 to t    0.338    0.402         
    x  CPS,  t   (2.04)**   (2.22)**      
Industry Average TQ UP dum t-1 to t      0.080           
  x CPS up from t-1 to t dum      (2.73)***           
Industry Average TQ UP dum t-1 to t        -0.056         
  x CPS, t  x small dum        (0.51)         
CPS,  t      1.932 1.764   1.696 1.931 1.854   1.806 
  (22.39)*** (14.78)***   (13.26)*** (22.38)*** (15.65)***   (14.22)*** 
CPS up from t-1 to t dum      0.107        0.093   
    (3.75)***     (3.32)***   
Industry Average ROA UP dum t-1 to t          0.059  0.005  0.000  0.011 
      (2.95)***  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.17) 
Industry Average ROA UP dum t-1 to t            0.156    0.214 
    x  CPS,  t       (1.95)*   (2.18)** 
Industry Average ROA UP dum t-1 to t              0.068   
  x CPS up from t-1 to t dum              (2.33)**   
Industry Average ROA UP dum t-1 to t                -0.123 
  x CPS, t  x small dum                (1.11) 
Log  book  value  0.443 0.443 0.445   0.443 0.443 0.445  
  (52.18)*** (52.17)*** (51.46)***   (52.19)*** (52.19)*** (51.44)***  
Small  dum     -0.940     -0.929 
     (28.87)***     (28.55)*** 
Tobin's  Q  0.186 0.187 0.191 0.191 0.188 0.187 0.193 0.192 
  (23.34)*** (23.36)*** (23.30)*** (22.27)*** (23.57)*** (23.52)*** (23.58)*** (22.43)*** 
CeoChair  dum  0.130 0.130 0.152 0.206 0.132 0.132 0.153 0.208 
  (5.64)*** (5.64)*** (6.42)*** (8.37)*** (5.70)*** (5.71)*** (6.48)*** (8.43)*** 
Constant  3.111 3.169 3.678 6.907 3.100 3.127 3.682 6.854 
  (42.94)*** (40.69)*** (52.81)*** (126.35)***  (42.73)*** (40.22)*** (53.00)*** (124.96)*** 
Observations  8755 8755 8400 8755 8755 8755 8400 8755 
R-squared  0.33 0.33 0.31 0.23 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.23TABLE 13: CEO TURNOVER AND CPS 
 
The sample consists of 11,221 firm year observations with available data on CEO turnover in year t and independent 
variables the year prior to the turnover. The regressions shown are logit regressions with robust standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level. We display the coefficients and t-statistics in brackets underneath. The dependent variable is 
a dummy equal to one if the CEO for firm i in year t-1 is not the same as in year t (there are 1326 turnovers). CPS is 
based on total compensation as measured by data item TDC1 from ExecuComp containing salary, bonus, other annual 
compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, long-term incentive 
payouts, and all other total incentive compensation. The industry-adjustment is done at the four-digit SIC level per 
year. The tenure dummies are equal to one if a CEO has exactly that number of years of tenure. Zero is the hold out 
group, i.e., CEOs who in year t-1 just joined the company. Stock return, t-1 is the return over the calendar year prior to 
the CEO turnover. Market return is the value-weighted CRSP return. Firm specific return is the difference between the 
firm and the market return. Column 5 includes two additional variables. CEOChair is a dummy equal to one if the CEO 
is also the Chairman and zero otherwise. CEO is only director is a dummy equal to one if none of the other top four 
executives is on the board, and zero otherwise. The sample size is smaller for data availability reasons related to the 
board memberships of the other top executives. $, *, ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CEO turnover dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ind-adj  CPS,  t-1  -2.957 -2.802 -2.587 -2.916 
  (6.76)** (6.48)** (5.41)** (5.69)** 
Stock return t-1  -0.372  -0.404    -0.209 
  (3.49)** (3.77)**   (1.66)$ 
Stock return, t-1 * Ind-adj CPS, t-1    1.684   
   (1.82)$   
Firm Specific Return, t-1      -0.397 
    ( 3 . 6 2 ) * *  
Firm Specific Return, t-1 * Ind-adj CPS, t-1     3.833 
    (1.69)$ 
Market Return, t-1      -0.424 
    ( 1 . 6 2 )  
Market Return, t-1 * Ind-adj CPS, t-1      1.385 
    ( 1 . 4 3 )  
Tenure = 1, t-1  7.279  7.281  7.285  7.202 
  (10.04)** (10.05)** (10.04)** (9.88)** 
Tenure = 2, t-1  5.146  5.142  5.142  4.851 
  (7.26)** (7.25)** (7.25)** (6.81)** 
Tenure = 3, t-1  0.069  0.069  0.070  -0.305 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.33) 
Tenure = 4, t-1  -1.187  -1.193  -1.191  -1.265 
  (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (1.03) 
Tenure = 5, t-1  0.057  0.057  0.056  0.035 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Tenure = 6, t-1  -0.142  -0.142  -0.146  -0.151 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Tenure > 6, t-1  0.483  0.480  0.482  0.106 
  (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) (0.14) 
CEOChair  dum     -0.363 
     ( 2 . 9 1 ) * *  
CEO only Dir dum        0.144 
     ( 1 . 0 9 )  
Constant  -5.739 -5.734 -5.734 -5.318 
  (8.09)** (8.08)** (8.10)** (7.37)** 
Observations  11221 11221 11221 11221 
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Pooled panel regressions (1) using industry fixed effects and standard errors clustered by industry, (2) using firm fixed-
effects and standard errors clustered by firm. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the monthly excess stock 
return, using the four-factor Fama-French model to compute excess returns. The sample is January 1992 to December 
2005. The description of the variables is contained in tables 2 and 3. $, *, ** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. 
  
 






         
CPS    -0.027  -0.013  
   (4.76 ** )  (2.30  ** )
Eindex    -0.002  -0.002  
    (3.08  ** )  (1.73  $ )
Founder    -0.003  -0.005  
   (1.03) (0.85)
CEO only exec. dir  0.002  -0.001  
   (1.16) (0.40)
Ceochair    -0.005  -0.010  
    (3.07  ** )  (6.07  ** )
CEO ownership    0.121  0.253  
    (2.05  ** ) (3.52  ** )
(CEO ownership)^2    -0.402  -0.665  
    (2.22  ** )  (2.37  ** )
Tenure    0.050  -0.032  
   (2.17  ** ) (0.95)
tenure^2    -0.141  -0.007  
   (2.31  ** ) (0.07)
Leverage    0.031  0.030  
   (4.64  ** )  (3.52  ** )
Size    -0.008  -0.007  
   (6.94  ** ) (4.05  ** )
Firm age    -0.056  0.003  
   (4.21  ** ) (0.18)
Capex/Assets    0.014  0.132  
   (0.30)  (2.40  ** )
Constant    0.182  0.146  
   (11.9  ** )  **
) (9.84
         
observations  87536  87536  
number of sic2 fe  63   
number of firms fe    1638  
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